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.,- MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EUROPE 1992 
When the member states of the European community (EC) * 
passed the Single European Act in 1987, they thereby indicated 
that all these nations would form a united economic order by 
1992. This EC action and subsequent steps also will move the 
member states toward greater political integration. A few 
advocates of this process of consolidation even anticipate that 
the changes planned for 1992 will take the EC close to true 
political union. This goal of a united Europe was envisioned by 
the leaders who laid the ECIs foundations with the establishment 
of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and the "Common 
- Market" in 1957. As a dream among Europeans, the idea of unity 
,-
that underlies these actions of the past thirty-five years 
emerged virtually at the birth of European civilization in the 
300s A.D. 
Many skeptics think that the vision of "EC 92" has no chance 
of realization. Europe 1992 has often been thought of by 
businessmen, politicians, and the general public worldwide as a 
project that would never get off its feet and, even if it did, a 
project that would never come to complete fruition. In fact, 
these antagonists had history on their side to back these claims. 
Ever since the passing of the reign of the Roman Caesars, the 
dream of a united and powerful Europe has met with failure, 
* The member states of the EC include Britain, Germany, Italy, 
France, Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands. 
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victim of the fierce independence that has permeated the various 
countries which shared geographical borders, but little else. 
Even the late President of France, Charles de Gaulle, warned of 
the impossibility of effectively governing a country that has 
"over 385 different types of cheese" (Silva and Sjogren 101). 
Contrary to the view of critics and the implication of history, 
the current program for unification of the member countries of 
the European Community into a single market is now well under 
way. Europe 1992 is about halfway through its implementation. 
The European Commission, an EC executive body, has formulated 
almost ninety percent of the 300 legal measures necessary to 
abolish fiscal, physical, and technical barriers to trade in 
~ goods and services (Walter 18). Perhaps the reason for the 
,,-... 
success of the plan so far results from the fact that this 
attempt does not come from the "heart or mind of a single person, 
party, or philosophy. Instead, its roots run deep in populist 
sentiment" (Silva and Sjogren 102). Additionally, this attempt 
for unification does not aim for world dominance as past attempts 
have. Rather, in keeping with the spirit of the Common Market at 
its founding, Europe 1992 is a quest for global equity. 
Although failure is highly unlikely at this stage, the 
inability to achieve this single market would cost Europeans 
millions in unnecessary expenses and lost opportunities. Instead 
of this outcome, the forces behind Europe 1992 seem destined to 
transform the world of international business and bring changes 
that will far surpass even those generated by the Japanese rise 
.-
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to economic dominance (silva and Sjogren 101). EC 92 will give a 
permanent boost to the prosperity of the people of Europe and the 
entire world. It will especially benefit the united States. 
More specifically, the new economic order will create immense 
opportunities within Europe for growth, employment, constructive 
competition, improved productivity, business mobility, stable 
prices, and consumer choice. "No single member state on its own 
could ever generate such a total transformation of its economic 
performance and prospects. It is only by completing the single 
European market of over 320 million people that will make those 
prospects a reality" (Cecchini xiv). Although such a 
successful restructuring is likely, many issues still need to be 
resolved before the program can be completed. Furthermore, 
certain measures will have to be carried out after the 1992 
deadline. One of the most prominent issues facing EC members is 
European monetary integration. It is critical in that "the full 
benefits of the single European financial market will not be 
achieved unless there is a common European currency designed to 
preempt recurrent exchange rate fluctuations and a possible 
relapse into exchange rate controls" (Walter 22). When this goal 
of monetary union is attained, the EC will become the largest 
financial market in the world. 
Over the past five years Europeans and others interested in 
EC 92 have actively debated the idea of monetary unification. 
Many proposals have emerged from this process of planning and 
discussion. An understanding of these competing notions of how 
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and when to take this step is necessary before the most logical, 
efficient, and beneficial alternative can be chosen. In the 
subsequent pages, this thesis will review the choices and advance 
arguments for the most viable option. 
One of the most detailed and logically impressive proposals 
was released in April 1989 by the committee for the study of 
Economic and Monetary Union, the Delors Committee (Thygesen 639). 
This proposal from the Committee chaired by the president of the 
European Commission is often used as the model for other monetary 
union plans. The Delors report stresses that two basic elements 
are necessary before monetary union can be fully achieved: 
completely free capital movement and irrevocably fixed exchange 
- rates. 
-
The Delors report proposes a three-stage approach to a 
monetary union that has these two traits. The first stage would 
aim at closer policy coordination on a voluntary basis (Thygesen 
642). Additionally, all EC currencies still freely floating 
would be brought into the current European Monetary System (EMS) * 
exchange rate mechanism. Stage two would be a "soft" monetary 
union with the formation of a central bank being the most 
important task. This phase would be primarily a transition 
period further promoting convergence and centering on 
institutional reforms. The final stage could be described as 
IIhard ll union. Monetary union then would involve the move to 
* The EMS is a system which keeps the participating currencies 
within certain defined upper and lower limits which results in 
exchange rate stability (Ungerer 14-15). 
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irrevocably locked exchange rates, strengthened common structural 
and regional policies, the introduction of a common currency, and 
the beginning of free-scale operation of the central bank or 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). with respect to the 
latter measure, the report states that the ESCB should be 
independent of political institutions, committed to price 
stability, and organized on a federal basis in accordance with 
the political diversity of the EC (Walter 22). 
The advantages to this proposal are many. For example, it 
is widely accepted that a complete single market cannot exist 
without monetary union and that monetary union "must imply the 
establishment, sooner or later, of a European federal bank with 
- the power to issue European money" (Lodge 105). This 
establishment of the ESCB is a central point of the Delors 
Report. 
The gradual approach is also a positive aspect of the 
report. For example, stage two is a necessary transition period 
to the final stage of locked exchange rates as it is hard to 
envision moving straight to fixed exchange rates without some 
experimentation. stage two is also to be used for gradual 
narrowing of margins of fluctuation within the EMS (Thygesen 
644) • 
Another advantage is that most of the member states are 
prepared to accept monetary union achieved by steps on the order 
of those outlined in the Delors Report. More specifically, 
Germany, the decisive country, accepts the report for two main 
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reasons. The German leaders see price stability as a major 
objective, and they advocate this gOal. Also, the report gives 
assurance of the autonomy of the central banking system, another 
feature preferred by Germany (Thygesen 647). 
Surprisingly, France has responded in a positive way to the 
report. "Once upon a time, any French-man who advocated 
abandoning the franc might have been tossed off the Eiffel Tower, 
but attitudes are changing" (Day 30). In fact, there was even 
disappointment in France that the time-scheme of the report was 
not more radical. Monetary union would bring French interest 
rates down to German levels, and it would keep France from having 
to raise interest rates defensively as that nation has had to do 
in the past (Thygesen 647). 
Italy has many attitudes in common with France. However, 
Italy is facing a budget deficit of ten to eleven percent of 
their Gross National Product (GNP). Thus, economic and monetary 
integration would allow Italy to avoid financing part of the 
deficit through money creation or surprise inflation. 
Spain has reacted positively to the report. This country 
showed its support most concretely by its recent entry into 
joining the EMS, climaxing four years of growing Spanish 
confidence in the Community. Britain's transition in attitudes 
has paralleled Spain's. Once persistent in resisting both 
participation in the EMS and active moves towards economic and 
monetary union, Britain joined the EMS in October 1990 and is 
showing a willingness to accept some form of the Delors Report 
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(Ungerer 15). 
Certainly, another advantage is that initial steps 
resembling those outlined in the Delors Report have already 
begun. On July 1, 1990, stage one of a process leading toward 
monetary union, as envisioned by the report, began. The European 
Council, a permanent European assembly established in 1948, has 
also drafted statutes for the ESCB. Council members, with the 
exception of Great Britain, agreed to begin stage two on January 
1, 1994 (Ungerer 16-17). 
Although it seems as though the Delors Report is the 
proposal which has been adopted, there are some disadvantages. 
Fortunately, it is not too late to allow for discussion of 
,~ alternative roads to monetary union. Even the report itself 
allows for adjustments. For example, it gave no deadline for 
implementation of the proposed stages making the report a solid 
base but one in which a time-table to implement is wide open. 
More importantly, the report did not specifically mention that 
there will be a single currency within the EC, but alluded that 
this would be for the better. 
Because of the problems in the Delors report, another 
proposal has been made that follows a similar pattern but 
specifically calls for monetary integration with a single 
currency. A single currency would replace domestic currencies 
whereas a common currency would be used throughout Europe 
alongside domestic currencies (Britton and Mayes 948). The most 
logical approach to the establishment of a single currency would 
8 
be the development of the European Currency unit (ECU), an 
existing "cocktail" of EC currencies and the basis of the EMS, 
into the single currency ("Kick" 81). The main disadvantage in 
the use of such a single currency would be the initial cost of 
changeover. This process would involve recalculating the value 
of millions of existing contracts into ECU terms. It would also 
involve calling in and reissuing all existing notes and coins in 
circulation (Britton and Mayes 948). 
The advantages of a single currency are many. A single 
currency would eliminate all those transaction costs which are 
involved in switching from one currency to another even if 
exchange rates are fixed (Britton and Mayes 948). It would also 
~ significantly reduce the foreign exchange reserves currently held 
since reserves will not be needed for a variety of currencies 
(Gros and Thygesen 926). A single currency would erase the 
burden of making calculations whenever there are business 
transactions done across national boundaries and the 
inconvenience of keeping accounts in several currencies. It 
would discourage the incentive to hedge against the possibility 
of exchange rate changes, which occur without a single currency 
however "irrevocable" exchange rates are supposed to be (Britton 
and Mayes 948). A single currency would somewhat replace the 
u.S. dollar as a transaction medium and store of value. It could 
also be expected to greatly enhance competition throughout the EC 
financial arena (Gros and Thygesen 927) and give the private 
sector greater confidence that monetary union will be maintained 
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(Britton and Mayes 948). Finally, it is simply hard to believe 
that the monetary union could acquire true common identity and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the outside world without a single 
currency (Thygesen 639). 
In response to this alternative proposal, there has been 
much debate about the use of the ECU as the single European 
currency. Two significant issues have emerged: (1) whether to 
use the ECU or some other currency (most likely the German 
Deutschmark); and (2), if the ECU is the most acceptable 
currency, whether or not to announce outright that it will be the 
single currency. 
With regard to the first debate, using the Deutschmark (DM) 
as the single currency might be advantageous to commercial banks 
and other financial institutions in Germany. However, it is 
unlikely that the central bank of Germany, the Bundesbank, would 
accept such an outcome. It is also doubtful that the DM would 
become the single currency of Europe because of the obvious 
political objections it would create (Britton and Mayes 949). 
Thus, it seems that the ECU would be the most acceptable single 
currency. It is a currency basket of EC countries and therefore 
would escape much of the political opposition. Using this form 
of currency, central banks could set objectives for the ECU 
interest rate or the ECU price level, which they would work 
together to achieve (Britton and Mayes 951). 
Another debate that has erupted is whether or not to 
announce immediately that the ECU will eventually be the single 
.-
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European currency. For both political and economic reasons, it 
seems that immediate announcement would be the most beneficial. 
The announcement will let everyone know that all national 
currencies will disappear in due course. It would give European 
banks an incentive to develop business in ECUs as it would give 
them a competitive advantage during the transition period 
(Britton and Mayes 949-950). This increased business use would 
also help the ECU achieve status as a competitive commodity, 
establishing itself as a rival to the dollar and the yen and 
preparing it for the transition into the single European currency 
(Silva and sjogren 142). Ultimately, the early announcement of a 
commitment to the ECU as the single currency could, "of itself, 
act as a catalyst and speed up the process [of monetary union]" 
(Britton and Mayes 950). 
There are also other alternatives which do not follow the 
approach to monetary union set forth by the Delors Report. One 
such proposal has arisen because of concern that the freeing of 
capital markets and the formation of a single market will make 
the present European Monetary system unstable. Therefore, 
proponents of this alternative suggest allowing more flexibility 
of exchange rates during an initial period. This might be an 
attractive way of managing the existing EMS, but it is a step in 
the wrong direction on the way towards monetary union. "It would 
make the commitment to price stability weaker in those countries 
which allowed their currencies to depreciate" (Britton and Mayes 
954), and it would delay the entire process of monetary union. 
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Consequently, this approach would stall the entire process of 
becoming a truly single market. 
Another alternative is one which embraces the idea of 
currency competition. This alternative was presented by united 
Kingdom authorities in response to the Delors Report. Their 
concept of monetary integration advocates an evolutionary 
approach as opposed to the institutional approach set forth by 
the Oelors Report (Ungerer 15). This approach would rely on 
"free mobility of capital and the natural forces of competition 
to create a spontaneous movement towards a common, or even a 
single, currency" (Britton and Mayes 954). Currency competition 
is a system which is both inadequate and infeasible. First and 
,~ foremost, the most likely result of this approach would be more 
widespread use of existing currencies, especially the OM, the 
French franc, and the British pound sterling. It is unlikely 
that the ECU could prevail in such a competition (Britton and 
Mayes 955). "Currency competition would not in the long run 
provide more guarantees for price stability than the kind of 
joint management through a European central banking system which 
has been proposed in the (Oelors) Report" (Thygesen 651). In 
currency competition, where national currencies are not 
irrevocably linked to each other, it is not possible to speak of 
monetary union or expect the full benefits which would come from 
monetary union (Ungerer 15). Furthermore, it is not entirely 
clear whether this proposal was framed with monetary union as its 
expected end result. 
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In June 1990, British Chancellor of the Exchequer John Major 
presented another proposal. It envisioned an important role for 
the ECU by having it exist and compete alongside national 
currencies. First, ECUs would be issued on demand against the 
other currencies. Second, the ECU would become a genuine 
currency that would never devalue against other EC currencies. 
Eventually, the ECU would become more widely used and could 
become a common currency and, in the very long run, the single 
currency of Europe (Ungerer 15). This approach seems feasible 
and acceptable on the surface, yet there are a few significant 
deficiencies which make it an unacceptable alternative. First, 
the proposal is vague in stating whether the ECU would eventually 
~- become the single currency or even the common currency. 
Furthermore, this alternative provides little guidance for a 
definite timetable for engaging in these ECU activities. 
Finally, it does not indicate "when the conditions would be 
right for moving to the final stage of full monetary union" 
(Ungerer 15). 
still another alternative is one which calls for forcing the 
pace of change. This alternative accepts fully the concept of 
moving towards a single currency. However, realizing that the 
gains from a single currency arise after the period of transition 
is complete, advocates of this alternative propose moving 
straight to adopting a single currency as soon as the 
administrative changes can be made. Unfortunately, simulation 
studies have shown that forcing the pace of change is too risky 
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an alternative as it would not be manageable in economic or 
political terms (Britton and Mayes 955). Additionally, all of 
the EC countries are not prepared at this point to take on the 
costs of convergence into a single currency. 
After examination of these many alternatives, an adequate, 
efficient, and logical process towards European Monetary Union 
may be put together. Because a first stage resembling stage one 
of the Delors Report began on July 1, 1990, and because of the 
many logical aspects of the report, the process towards monetary 
union should be formed in a framework resembling the Delors 
Report but containing some more specific directives. 
First, the process should stress commitment to eventually 
initiating a single currency, the ECU, for the EC. This approach 
is necessary since it is well known that the single European 
financial market cannot be fully achieved without a common 
currency and probably without a single currency. with respect to 
the use of the ECU, it is important to announce at the outset 
that the ECU is going to be the single currency of Europe one 
day. Familiarizing the market with use of the ECU in the period 
of transition to EMU and discouraging the use of other national 
currencies is also a necessary procedure to be undertaken in 
conjunction with the ECU currency approach. Adhering to a 
process based somewhat on the Delors Report is also encouraged 
because of its gradual approach to monetary union. A forced or 
hasty transition to monetary union is simply not feasible. 
However, unlike the plan of the Delors Report, the process 
-,-
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towards monetary integration should be set up under a specific 
timetable and should be implemented as closely as possible to 
this timetable. 
It seems reasonable and widely accepted that the final step 
of this process would be taken in about 1997. At that point, 
monetary union would be formed, and, at the same time, the ECU 
would be introduced as the single currency of Europe. All other 
domestic currencies and all contracts made in domestic currencies 
would be converted to the ECU. From then on, "there would be an 
ECU money supply, and each member country would have an ECU-
denominated monetary base--all firmly under the control of the 
new [central] banking system" (Britton and Mayes 957). 
The achievement of full monetary union should be the last 
step in reaching the Single European Market, for it is widely 
accepted that complete unification requires common currency. 
Although other major problems do exist, success in reaching 
monetary union is much more complex and requires much more 
contention and arduous work than is necessary to overcome any of 
the other obstacles. For example, one of the other problems is 
the slow movement of the British in many matters. However, many 
agree that in most matters, at this stage, if advantages outweigh 
the disadvantages, it will happen with or without the British 
(Day 30). In most cases, it will be the British who would 
inevitably suffer a competitive disadvantage (Matthewson A19). 
Therefore, with such knowledge available, problems such as these 
can be overcome with a little work and some patience. 
,-
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In the end, "Europe 1992," even if it comes in 1997, will 
produce the largest single financial market in the world, 
providing innumerable opportunities and benefits, many probably 
unanticipated, to the member states of the EC. It will similarly 
affect the United states and the rest of the world. However, EC 
92 cannot promise any clear individual winners or losers as it 
brings about this single market. The winners will be determined 
by the extent to which companies and governments take advantage 
of these immense opportunities. 
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